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Abstract. Only recently have women been recruited to serve 
in Canadian cabinets, and their presence in these bodies 
remains marginal, although it is progressing steadily. This 
article has the objective to examine the role of some institu-
tional variables on women’s access to federal and provincial 
cabinets in Canada, from 1984 to the end of 2007. Six hy-
potheses are tested exploring the following independent 
variables: the overall proportion of female legislators versus 
the proportion of women within the government caucus 
only; the region; the majority or minority status of the gov-
ernment; the change (or lack of change) of government 
following a general election; the size of the cabinet; and, the 
political party that forms the government. The overall pro-
portion of women legislators and notably, their proportion 
within the government caucus both exert an almost monopo-
listic influence on the feminization rate of cabinets. In addi-
tion, the results invite to qualify the idea which suggests that 
the higher a political role, the harder it is for women to at-
tain. 
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Résumé. C’est seulement il y a peu que les femmes ont été 
recrutées pour servir dans les conseils des ministres cana-
diens, et leur présence dans ces organes reste marginale, 
bien qu’elle augmente régulièrement. Cet article a pour 
objectif d’examiner le rôle de certaines variables institution-
nelles sur l’accès des femmes dans les conseils des ministres 
aux niveaux fédéral et provincial au Canada, de 1984 à fin 
2007. Six hypothèses sont testées afin d’explorer les va-
riables indépendantes suivantes : la proportion globale de 
femmes législateurs versus la proportion de femmes dans le 
caucus du gouvernement uniquement; la région; le statut 
majoritaire ou minoritaire du gouvernement; l’alternance 
(ou l’absence d’alternance) gouvernementale à la suite d’une 
élection générale; la taille du conseil des ministres; et le parti 
politique qui compose le gouvernement. La proportion glo-
bale de femmes législateurs et, notamment, leur proportion 
au sein du caucus du gouvernement sont deux variables qui 
exercent une influence presque monopolistique sur le taux 
de féminisation des conseils des ministres. En outre, les 
résultats invitent à nuancer l’idée selon laquelle plus le rôle 
politique est élevé, plus il est difficile pour les femmes de 
l’atteindre. 
 
Mots clefs. Canada; femmes dans les conseils des ministres. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Today, there is a wealth of literature on women elected in 
politics, particularly in national legislatures. Knowledge is 
much less abundant, however, with regard to women who 
are members of executive bodies, such as ministers in cabi-
nets. One reason, no doubt, is women have gained access to 
these select circles of state executive power relatively recent-
ly and the number remains very limited, although it has 
grown in recent years. In 1987, the Centre for Social Devel-
opment and Humanitarian Affairs of the United Nations 
Office at Vienna (1992: 63) observed that 3.5% of the minis-
terial roles in about 155 national governments were occupied 
by women. A decade later, in 1998, still only 302 out of 
3,486 (8.7%) cabinet ministers in 180 national governments 
were women (Reynolds 1999). Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-
Robinson (2005) fixed this proportion at 12% in 2003, while 
Mathiason (2006: 6) found that on average women filled 
10.6% of governmental decision-making positions in 2005. 
Data from the Inter-Parliamentary Union (2010) indicate 
that in January 2010, 16.9% of the approximately 4,100 
ministers in 188 countries were women. 
Canada is not excluded from these general trends. First, 
women’s access to Canadian legislative spaces has generated 
much more published research than has their participation 
in cabinets (among others: Arscott and Trimble 1997, 
Bashevkin 2009a, Brodie 1985, Megyery 1991, Tremblay 
2010, Tremblay and Andrew 1998, Tremblay and Trimble 
2003). Second, only recently have women been recruited to 
serve in Canadian cabinets, and their presence in these 
bodies remains marginal, although it is progressing steadily. 
The proportion of women in all federal and provincial cabi-
nets in Canada rose from an average of 1.1% in the 1950s, to 
3.3% in the 1960s, 4.1% in the 1970s, 10.1% in the 1980s, 
23.4% in the 1990s, and almost one quarter (24.4%) from 
2000 to 2007. As this essay will show, the proportion of 
women is now higher in cabinets than in provincial legisla-
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tures and the House of Commons, belying Putnam’s (1976: 
33) law of increasing disproportion. 
The objective of this article is to shed light on some insti-
tutional variables associated with women’s access to federal 
and provincial cabinets in Canada, from the mid-1980s to 
the end of 2007. Below, I define my working hypotheses, 
which were formulated on the basis of research available on 
women ministers in Canada. The following section includes 
the methodology and analysis. In the conclusion, I discuss 
the main points of the observations made with a focus on 
envisioning some future developments regarding women’s 
participation in Canadian cabinets. 
 
Theoretical Framework, State of Knowledge, 
and Working Hypotheses 
 
Canada’s government is a British-style parliamentary sys-
tem. One feature of this type of political system, distinguish-
ing it from the American system, is the fusion of legislative 
and executive powers: one results from the other – that is, 
the members of the cabinet (ministers) are also active mem-
bers of Parliament. Unlike political systems in which the 
legislative and executive functions are separate, in a parlia-
mentary system such as Canada’s, they are cumulative: as a 
rule, a person cannot be a minister, unless she or he is a 
member of the legislature. While access to legislative spaces 
depends on election, admission to the very select circle of the 
cabinet is the prerogative of the provincial or federal leader 
(premier or prime minister). Although it might seem, at first 
glance, that government leaders enjoy a broad margin of 
manoeuvre when assembling their cabinet (and this is cer-
tainly the case), they must also meet a certain number of 
requirements. For instance, one major constraint is that 
ministers must be selected from among the members of the 
leader’s legislative caucus. In other words, the range of can-
didates available to leaders to compose their cabinet is lim-
ited to the legislators from their party. 
Just as constraining, though informal, is the need for 
leaders to assemble a cabinet that reflects the range of inter-
ests present in Canada: as a general rule, the cabinet must 
include representation of a diversity of geographic spaces, 
economic sectors, cultures, and languages – and, in more 
recent times, must include women (White 2005: 35-36). Yet, 
this imperative for representativeness is subject to interpre-
tation: must the cabinet reflect the diversity of the popula-
tion, that of the legislators (that is, all legislators), or that of 
the legislative caucus of the party that forms the govern-
ment? 
When it comes to women, this question has generated at 
least two directions of research. One, defended notably by 
Davis (1997: 88) in her analysis of women members of min-
isters’ councils in fifteen European democracies between 
1968 and 1992, has it that the proportion of women minis-
ters depends less on their proportion within the party form-
ing the government than on their overall proportion in the 
legislature. 1  This reading is very credible in the context of 
coalition governments, common in Europe, in which gov-
ernments are formed of several of the parties that elected 
members to the parliament, but it loses its heuristic power in 
Canada, where governments composed of a single party are 
the rule. On the other hand, although the prime minister is 
the head of her or his party, she or he represents all Canadi-
ans as the head of government, a supra-representation func-
tion that justifies her or his taking account of the overall 
proportion of female legislators, rather than only the propor-
tion of women within her or his caucus, to establish the 
feminization rate of her or his cabinet. To this are added 
election-related considerations, which are ever-present in 
politics. The other research direction has it that it is the 
proportion of women in the government caucus, rather than 
the overall proportion of female legislators, that guides the 
leader, since she or he must draw on this group to select 
ministers. Studlar and Moncrief (1997, 1999) supported this 
idea following their study of the process of recruitment of 
women for Canadian provincial cabinets between 1976 and 
1994, even though they recognized that the overall propor-
tion of female legislators also constitutes a significant varia-
ble in the feminization rate of cabinets. From these two 
directions emerges a first working hypothesis: the propor-
tion of women in the cabinet reflects the proportion of fe-
male legislators in the legislative caucus of the party that 
forms the government. 
As mentioned above, leaders must also take account of 
criteria other than sex when forming their cabinet; one of 
these is geographic space. Since its foundation, in 1867, 
Canada has been the theatre of deep regionalisms that in-
spired, at least in part, the adoption of a federal, rather than 
unitary, state structure (Ajzenstat, Romney, Gentles and 
Gairdner 1999: 261-326); in return, federalism has no doubt 
contributed to fuelling and maintaining these regionalisms, 
which have become an integral part of Canada. At any rate, 
the Canadian Constitution institutionalizes the regions as a 
criterion for representation, notably when it comes to the 
Senate.2 Regional identities and cultures have been seen as 
factors in explaining the unequal access of women to various 
Canadian legislatures, with the Atlantic provinces showing 
less enthusiasm for political participation by women (Arscott 
1997, Brodie 1977, Moncrief and Studlar 1996, Studlar and 
Matland 1996, Studlar and Moncrief 1997, Vickers and Bro-
die 1981; for a critical perspective see O’Neill and Erickson 
2003). Whence a second working hypothesis: the feminiza-
tion rate in cabinets is lower in the Atlantic provinces than in 
other Canadian regions. 
To the above requirements of representativeness (sex 
and geographic space) in assembling a cabinet is added a 
legislative context bestowed by the popular vote. Thus the 
legislative pool available to the government party may exert 
a certain influence on women’s access to Canadian cabinets, 
according to observations made by two authors. In an at-
tempt to identify some of the factors associated with ap-
pointments to federal cabinets between 1935 and 2008, 
Kerby (2009) examined whether the size of the legislative 
caucus of the party forming the government influenced the 
chance of acceding to the cabinet. He postulated that the 
smaller the size of the legislative caucus, the greater the 
possibilities for women to accede to the cabinet, because a 
small caucus offers the leader less choice than does a larger 
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caucus. This reasoning proved to be well founded. Kerby 
found that between 1935 and 2008, female members of 
Parliament representing the governing party had a 50% 
higher chance of being appointed to the cabinet than did 
their male colleagues. Clearly, female legislators in a small 
government caucus have every reason to hope to receive an 
invitation to join the cabinet. Similarly, in an article in which 
she summarizes her observations with regard to women’s 
participation in cabinets in a number of English-speaking 
countries (essentially, Australia, Canada, Great Britain, 
Ireland, New Zealand, and the United States), Sykes (2009: 
54) develops the idea that in the absence of a strong legisla-
tive majority, the government leader may want to portray 
herself or himself as ‘first among peers’ and thus form a 
cabinet in which a collective decision-making process pre-
vails. Following this reasoning, the party leader may be more 
inclined to put together an open – that is, inclusive and 
diversified – cabinet, because her or his party does not have 
a large legislative caucus. In this context, appointment of 
women to the cabinet may be a strategy deployed by the 
leader to extend her or his electoral base among female 
voters – and ultimately to fortify her or his legislative caucus 
in the next election. From this reasoning flows a third work-
ing hypothesis: the smaller the legislative majority of the 
government caucus, the more feminized will be the cabinet. 
The rate of legislative turnover is another contextual da-
tum bestowed by elections. The Canadian House of Com-
mons has one of the highest rates of turnover of legislators 
among Western democracies (Matland and Studlar 2004), 
and provincial legislatures show a rate of turnover similar to 
that for the House of Commons (Moncrief 1998). Yet, Young 
(1991) maintains, a high turnover rate of elected personnel 
(attributable to voluntary or involuntary departures) should 
contribute to larger numbers of women receiving legislative 
mandates, notably because the candidacies from opposition 
parties are often less competitive (and thus more accessible 
to women) than are those of the government party; if the 
turnover is substantial, the influx of new faces may result in 
a change of government (Brodie 1985: 124, Studlar and 
Moncrief 1997, Tremblay 2009, Young 1991). In fact, Studlar 
and Moncrief (1999; see also Darcy, Welch and Clark 1994: 
119-137) observe, changes of government contribute to 
bringing more women into the cabinet. It may be that the 
newly elected leader wishes to distinguish her or his admin-
istration from the previous one, or that the presence of a 
larger number of female legislators and the requirement of 
representativeness of women in the cabinet exerts pressure 
in favour of its feminization. The fourth working hypothesis 
follows this line of reasoning: changes of government result 
in more substantial proportions of women ministers. 
However, Studlar and Moncrief (1999) express two res-
ervations regarding their observation about the beneficial 
effect of changes of government on the proportion of women 
ministers. First, they posit that the feminization of cabinets 
may be linked to their size. A number of authors use this 
reasoning to argue that proportional representation list (that 
is, multimember constituency) voting systems, more than 
their plurality/majority and single-member constituency 
counterparts, favour the election of female candidates: the 
more places there are to fill, the more embarrassing it be-
comes when only men occupy them (Matland 2005, Norris 
2004: 179-208, Salmond 2006).3 Thus, a fifth hypothesis is 
that the larger the size of the cabinet, the more women are in 
it. 
The other reservation expressed by Studlar and Moncrief 
(1999) concerns the ideological label of the architect of the 
cabinet – the government leader. A number of studies have 
shown that left-wing parties are quicker to promote the 
political citizenship of women than are right-wing parties 
(among others: Caul 2006: 73-79, Escobar-Lemmon and 
Taylor-Robinson 2005, Jones 2009, Mateo Diaz 2005: 76; 
but see Forest 2011, Holli 2008, Murray 2008). In general, 
three ideological families share the political field in Canada: 
conservatism (on the right side of the political spectrum), 
liberalism (in the centre), and social democracy (on the 
centre-left). 4  Although the influence of these ideologies 
varies over time, through space, and by context, as a general 
rule conservatism manifests less enthusiasm for the ad-
vancement of women’s political citizenship than do liberal-
ism and, especially, social democracy. 
Studies have shown that in Canada, in general, female 
Liberal and New Democratic candidates and legislators are 
more pro-feminist than are their Conservative counterparts 
(Tremblay 1993, 2010: 115-141, Tremblay and Pelletier 
2001). On the other hand, the latter do contribute to a pro-
ject of women’s political representation, either by introduc-
ing into the Conservative space certain positions associated 
with the women’s movement (Tremblay and Pelletier 2003) 
or by working in concert with Liberals and New Democrats 
to promote these positions in legislative backrooms or extra-
legislative zones (Bashevkin 2009b: 16-17, 2009c). A num-
ber of major studies have discussed the accomplishments of 
the New Democratic Party (NDP) with regard to women’s 
rights. For instance, its electoral commitments to women are 
more generous and its ranks more feminized (Cochrane 
1977: 77, Kohn 1984, Moncrief and Studlar 1996, Trimble 
1993, Whitehorn and Archer 1995). Studlar and Moncrief 
(1997; see also Moncrief and Studlar 1996) note, however, 
that the Liberals often follow closely behind the New Demo-
crats in promotion of women’s rights, a fact that is especially 
significant because the former hold the reins of power more 
often than do the latter. The last hypothesis, therefore, ex-
plores the ideological positioning of parties, advancing that 
right-wing cabinets have a lower proportion of women than 
do centrist and centre-left cabinets. 
 
Methodology 
 
This study takes the feminization rate of federal and provin-
cial cabinets as the unit of analysis. A cabinet is defined as ‘a 
collegial body in which – the first minister aside – ministers 
engage in genuinely collective decision making (…). [Cabi-
net] is limited to twenty or thirty people, who gain admission 
and retain membership only with the first minister’s approv-
al.’ (White 2005: 21-22, 24) Two constraints on the choice of 
cabinets were imposed. First, only cabinets formed following 
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a general federal or provincial election were used, and those 
resulting from a cabinet shuffle were ignored. This choice is 
explained essentially by the availability and, especially, 
regularity, of sources of information. Second, although two 
women were appointed ministers in 1921 and some 30 be-
fore 1984, the present research looks only at cabinets formed 
between 1984 and 2007, inclusive, whether or not they had 
women in their ranks.5 The reason that cabinets from 1921 to 
1983 are not used is their low feminization rate (an average 
of 2.9%), which skews the results of the statistical analysis. 
In other words, if the 126 cabinets formed between 1921 and 
1983 are included, the average feminization rate for the 
period 1921-2007 is 9.2%, whereas the rate climbs to 20.3% 
when they are excluded (and only the period from 1984 to 
2007 is used). 
Beyond these numerical considerations, there are five 
reasons for choosing the mid-1980s as the starting point for 
this study. First, as Studlar and Matland (1994) observe, 
there was a turning point with regard to women’s legislative 
representation in Canada in the 1980s: the number of seats 
that they occupied grew from very few to a relatively large 
number over the course of the decade. For instance, follow-
ing the 1984 federal general election, the number and the 
proportion of women in the House of Commons almost 
doubled overnight (from 14 to 27 women MPs, or from 5% to 
9.6%). Of course, the occupancy of less than 10% of seats can 
hardly be considered substantial representation; neverthe-
less, the 1984 election was a turning point because it marked 
a break with the past and established an informal bench-
mark for representation of women in the future. Further-
more, as mentioned above, because the legislature consti-
tutes the pool for recruitment of ministers, the higher the 
number of female legislators, the stronger is the supply of 
female candidates for cabinet positions. Second, in 1981 
Canada ratified a major instrument of international law with 
regard to women’s rights: the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). 
Articles 7 and 8 of the Convention deal with political equality 
of women and men. Third, in 1982 Canada adopted the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, section 15 of 
which, guaranteeing equality of the sexes, came into effect in 
1985. Fourth, in 1984 a leaders’ debate took place exclusively 
on women’s issues; this event, still unique in Canadian elec-
toral annals, not only helped to mobilize women voters 
(Cohen 1993) but put these issues on the electoral agenda 
and revealed their political dimensions. Finally, in 1985, the 
last government (in Nova Scotia) that had only male minis-
ters fell, and the ensuing cabinet finally admitted women. In 
short, the units of observation for this research are the 71 
cabinets formed following a general provincial or federal 
election in Canada held between 1984 and 2007. 
The independent variables differ from hypothesis to hy-
pothesis and include the overall proportion of female legisla-
tors (all parties combined) and the proportion of women 
within the government caucus only, the region and province 
of the cabinet, the majority or minority status of the gov-
ernment, the change or lack of change of government follow-
ing a general election, the size of the cabinet (or the number 
of ministers), and the political party that forms the govern-
ment. A temporal variable was also created: the sub-periods 
of 1984 to 1995 and 1996 to 2007. This division in the mid-
1990s is based on two factors: 1) the Fourth World Confer-
ence on Women held in Beijing in 1995, in which Canada 
was a participant and at which it committed itself to equality 
of the sexes; 2) the significantly different proportions of 
women ministers before and after 1995, leading to the notion 
of two distinct cohorts or eras with regard to participation of 
women in Canadian governments. 
The statistical analysis consisted of T-tests and ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression analysis. Chosen due to the 
nature of the dependent and independent variables at work, 
the OLS regression enabled me to determine which variables 
are significantly associated with the proportion of women in 
Canadian cabinets from 1984 to 2007. 
 
Analysis of the results 
 
A first section presents the results of descriptive analyses for 
each hypothesis, and a second section looks in greater depth 
at the most significant observations through regression 
analyses. 
 
Comparisons of averages 
Hypothesis 1: The proportion of women in the cabinet re-
flects the proportion of female legislators in the legislative 
caucus of the party that forms the government. 
One pillar of British-style parliamentarianism is that 
government leaders choose their ministers from the legisla-
tive caucus of their party. This principle must be combined 
with the requirement of representativeness of women in the 
cabinet. In theory, a government caucus devoid of women 
would translate into a cabinet devoid of women. Moreover, 
the proportion of female legislators on the government side 
offers the government leader a convenient benchmark for 
justifying the proportion, more or less generous, of women 
within her or his cabinet. On the other hand, it could be 
argued that the cabinet is accountable to the population on 
the whole, because the government must have the confi-
dence of a majority of elected representatives to stay in 
power, and reference to all female legislators, notwithstand-
ing their political party, may constitute a fairer benchmark 
for the proportion of seats occupied by women in the cabi-
net. 
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Table 1. Average Proportion of Women Cabinet Ministers, 
Members of the Government Caucus and Legislators, 1984-
2007 
 
 Cabinet 
Ministers3 
Government 
Caucus4 
Legislators4 
Overall average 
proportion (71 
cabinets)2 
20.3 17.8 17.4 
Federal 22.2* (7) 17.8 (7) 17.7 (7) 
Western Canada 
(Alberta, British 
Columbia, Man-
itoba, Sas-
katchewan) 
22.0** (24) 20.3*** (24) 19.8*** (24) 
Central Canada 
(Ontario, Que-
bec)1 
26.1*** (13) 20.2** (13) 19.4** (13) 
Atlantic provinces 
(New Bruns-
wick, New-
foundland and 
Labrador, Nova 
Scotia, Prince 
Edward Island) 
15.5 (27) 14.4 (27) 14.3 (27) 
Atlantic provinces 
(without Nova 
Scotia) 
18.5 (20) --- --- 
________ 
* : P≤0.10; ** : P≤0.05; *** : P≤0.01. 
 
1) The common practice is to distinguish four regions in 
Canada: Western Canada, Atlantic provinces, Ontario, and 
Quebec. Here, the last two have been merged for two rea-
sons. The first concerns the low number of cases: only six 
cabinets were constituted in Quebec and seven in Ontario 
between 1984 and 2007. I therefore decided to merge the 
two provinces in order to generate a stronger category for 
statistical analysis. The second is that the proportions of 
women cabinet ministers in Ontario (23.8%) and Quebec 
(28.9%) from 1984 to 2007 are not statistically significant, 
and this is true also for women members of the government 
caucus (17.9% in Ontario and 22.9% in Quebec) and women 
MPs in the entire legislature (17.4% in Ontario and 21.8% in 
Quebec).  
2) Differences between 20.3%, 17.8% and 17.4% all sig-
nificant at P≤0.001. 
3) T-tests in which the average proportion of women 
ministers in the comparison category (“Atlantic provinces”) 
is significantly lower than the proportion of women minis-
ters in central Canada (P≤0.01), western Canada (P≤0.05), 
and the federal government (P≤0.10). When Nova Scotia is 
excluded, the proportion of women ministers in the Atlantic 
provinces is no longer significantly lower than that in central 
Canada (18.5% versus 26.1%, P≤0.05). 
4) T-tests in which the average proportion of women leg-
islators in the government caucus and total women legisla-
tors in the comparison category (“Atlantic provinces”) is 
significantly lower than the proportions of women legislators 
in the government caucus and total women legislators in 
central Canada (P≤0.05) and western Canada (P≤0.01). 
 
As table 1 shows, an average of 20.3% of members of the 71 
federal and provincial cabinets formed in Canada between 
1984 and 2007 were women (the proportions were 14.7% for 
the sub-period 1984-95 and 24.3% for the sub-period 1996-
2007), with some cabinets containing none and others flirt-
ing with parity of the sexes. For comparative purposes, the 
government legislative caucuses from which these ministers 
were recruited had an average feminization rate of 17.8% 
(13.2% for the sub-period 1984-95 and 21% for the sub-
period 1996-2007), and the full legislatures had an average 
proportion of 17.4% (13.8% for 1984-95 and 20% for 1996-
2007) female legislators. All of the differences between the 
earlier period and the later one are statistically significant at 
P=0.001. Not surprisingly, the percentage of women minis-
ters and the percentage of women in the government legisla-
tive caucus are strongly correlated (Pearson: 0.797, P=0.001; 
0.876, P=0.001 for 1984-95; 0.622, P=0.001 for 1996-2007). 
On the other hand, this is also true for the relationship be-
tween the proportion of female ministers and the overall 
proportion of women legislators (Pearson: 0.756, P=0.001; 
0.771, P=0.001 for 1984-95; 0.599, P=0.001 for 1996-2007). 
In their study of women’s participation in Canadian pro-
vincial cabinets from 1976 to 1994, Studlar and Moncrief 
(1999) urged caution when interpreting such data, because 
of the strong collinearity that may exist between the overall 
proportion of female legislators and the proportion of wom-
en in the government legislative caucus. A number of cases 
testify to this, including two extreme examples: in 1987, the 
Liberal Party won all of the seats in the New Brunswick 
Legislative Assembly, and all female legislators necessarily 
belonged to the government caucus; in the 1991 Saskatche-
wan general election, 11 of the 12 women elected belonged to 
the party forming the government. A very strong statistical 
correlation links the overall proportion of female legislators 
and the proportion of women in the government legislative 
caucus (Pearson: 0.877, P=0.001; 0.947, P=0.001 for 1984-
95; 0.743, P=0.001 for 1996-2007), which should not be 
surprising since almost two thirds (65.9%) of provincial and 
federal female legislators between 1984 and 2007 were 
members of the government legislative caucus. The regres-
sion analyses reported below will confirm the problems of 
inter-collinearity between these variables. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The feminization rate in cabinets in the At-
lantic provinces is lower than in other Canadian regions. 
Some research has found that the Atlantic provinces have 
performed more modestly with regard to political represen-
tation by women. The observations of the present study 
support this. Comparisons – the results of which appear in 
table 1 – reveal that, for the period from 1984 to 2007, the 
Atlantic provinces had a significantly lower average propor-
tion of women ministers than did the other regions.6 The 
lower significance threshold between the Atlantic provinces 
and the federal government may be explained by the small 
number of units in the latter cell. Moreover, considering 
these data in light of the sub-periods, only two tests prove to 
be significant at the 95% threshold for the sub-period 1996-
2007 – that is, between the Atlantic provinces, which had an 
average of 19.3% women ministers, and the Central and 
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Western regions, with 29.5% and 26.3% women ministers, 
respectively. 
Can the smaller proportion of women ministers in the 
Atlantic provinces be explained by the ideology of the party 
forming the governments – that is, a greater number of 
Conservative cabinets? At first glance, no: of the 27 govern-
ments formed in the Atlantic provinces between 1984 and 
2007, 14 (51.9%) were Conservative and almost as many (13 
or 48.1%) were Liberal. In their study of women’s represen-
tation in provincial legislatures from 1975 to 1994, Studlar 
and Matland (1996) observe that the Atlantic provinces are 
somewhat behind the other regions of Canada, but they 
point out the uneven performance by women from province 
to province in the region; in 1993, the legislature of Prince 
Edward Island was the most feminized in all of Canada 
(28.1%); that of Newfoundland and Labrador had only 5.8% 
female members, and women occupied 15.5% and 9.6% of 
the legislative seats in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, 
respectively. The Atlantic provinces were no more homoge-
neous with regard to women’s participation at the executive 
level. In fact, the lower feminization rate in cabinets in At-
lantic Canada is attributable to a single province: Nova Sco-
tia. On the one hand, between 1984 and 2007 women occu-
pied an average of 7% of cabinet seats in that province, com-
pared to 18% in Prince Edward Island (gap significant at 
P≤0.01 with Nova Scotia), 19.4% (P≤0.01) in New Bruns-
wick, and 18.4% (P≤0.05) in Newfoundland and Labrador. 
On the other hand, comparing the regional averages once 
again for the period 1984 to 2007 with Nova Scotia with-
drawn from the analysis, the feminization rate in Atlantic 
provincial cabinets is no longer significantly below that of 
the federal government or the Western region, though it 
remains so compared to the Central region (18.5% versus 
26.1%, P≤0.05; see table 1). 
 
Hypothesis 3: The smaller the legislative majority of the 
government caucus, the more feminized will be the cabinet. 
The legislative caucus of the party that forms the govern-
ment is the pool of candidates from which the government 
leader must select her or his ministers, with its size condi-
tioning the range of possible choices; in theory, a large cau-
cus offers more choice than does a small caucus. What is 
more, the pressure to have representation by women is 
imposed to the point that the leader of a minority govern-
ment might be tempted to form an inclusive and diversified 
cabinet including women with the intent of broadening her 
or his electoral base by pandering to a women and/or femi-
nist electorate and thus gaining a majority government in 
the following election. This reading does not hold. On the 
one hand, there is no correlation between the proportion of 
seats held by the party that forms the government and the 
proportion of women ministers, either for the entire period 
of 1984 to 2007 or for the sub-periods. On the other hand, 
provincial and federal cabinets formed in the context of 
minority governments7 between 1984 and 2007 did not have 
significantly fewer women on average than did cabinets 
formed during majority governments, or 16.9% versus 
20.8%, this lack of statistical difference being maintained for 
both sub-periods. It must be said that leaders of minority 
governments had a less feminized caucus to choose from 
than did those of majority governments – 16.3% versus 18% 
– as tighter electoral battles seem to discourage women’s 
access to legislatures, which are springboards to cabinets. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Changes of the government result in more 
substantial proportions of women ministers. 
Aside from contributing to the election of women, sub-
stantial turnover rates following a general election some-
times bring about a change of government, a juncture that 
may favour women’s access to the cabinet, especially if the 
election results bring large numbers of them to the govern-
ment legislative caucus. Once again, this reasoning does not 
hold: between 1984 and 2007, the 25 changes of provincial 
and federal administration that occurred following a general 
election did not generate cabinets that were significantly 
more feminized than were those resulting from governments 
returned to power: 21.2% compared to 19.9%.  
Studlar and Moncrief (1999) emphasized that the pre-
sumably positive effect of changes of government on wom-
en’s access to cabinets could be explained by the ideological 
trend of the new administration. While extreme cases en-
gender clear results, less extreme ones are more ambiguous. 
For instance, cabinets that change from New Democrat to 
Conservative see the proportion of women fall dramatically, 
and the inverse is true. The ascent to power of the Conserva-
tive Party of Ontario in 1995 caused the number of women in 
the cabinet to plummet from 40.7% to 21.1%. On the other 
hand, when the New Democrats dethroned the Social Credit 
Party at the head of British Columbia in 1991, the percentage 
of women ministers leapt by almost 26% – from 11.1% to 
36.8%. Following eight of the ten changes of administration 
in which the Conservatives lost power to the Liberals or the 
Liberals to the New Democrats, the proportion of women 
ministers improved. However, in the ten elections in which 
the change of government went from left to right by only one 
position on the ideological spectrum (from New Democrat to 
Liberal or from Liberal to Conservative), there was no clear 
trend. Thus, the taking of the reins of power by the Con-
servatives does not have the compulsory corollary of a drop 
in the proportion of women in the cabinet, as evidenced by 
the Mulroney cabinet set up after the 1984 federal general 
election – although the inverse is also seen with the Harper 
cabinet of 2006. In fact, these two examples force us to 
recognize that conservatism is not monolithic but contains 
nuances: Stephen Harper’s conservatism includes a strong 
social component, while Brian Mulroney’s did not (Bashev-
kin 1996). The same reasoning holds when executive rule 
passes from a New Democrat regime to a Liberal regime: 
there is not necessarily a drop in the proportion of women 
ministers. In this regard, however, Studlar and Moncrief 
(1997; see also Moncrief and Studlar 1996) noted that Liber-
als and New Democrats are very similar with regard to pro-
motion of women’s rights. 
 
Hypothesis 5: The larger the cabinet, the more women are 
in it. 
This hypothesis takes up a widespread argument used to 
explain the positive impact of proportional representation 
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list (i.e., multimember constituency) voting systems on the 
election of women: when a large number of seats are availa-
ble, it becomes politically risky for all of them to be filled by 
people who resemble each other (for example, only men). 
This reasoning sheds light on a condition associated with 
women’s access to Canadian federal and provincial cabinets 
between 1984 and 2007: the larger the cabinet, the more 
women are in it (Pearson: 0.519, P=0.001). As table 2 shows, 
when cabinets are distributed by size,8 it seems that the 
more seats there are around the cabinet table, the more 
women are recruited to occupy them.  
 
Table 2. Average Number and Proportion of Women Ministers 
 
Number of 
(women 
and men) minis-
ters 
Average 
number* 
Average 
proportion 
1984-2007 (71)   
9-17 (23) 2.8 19.6 
18-22 (23) 3.8 19.9 
23-39 (25) 5.8 21.5 
1984-1995 (29)   
9-17 (23) 1.9 12.5 
18-22 (23) 2.5 13.1 
23-39 (25) 4.9 17.6 
1996-2007 (42)   
9-17 (23) 3.3 23.4 
18-22 (23) 4.8 25.0 
23-39 (25) 6.5 24.5 
_______________ 
* T tests revealing significant differences at P≤0.10 (2.8 vs. 3.8), 
P≤0.05 (3.3 vs. 4.8; 2.5 vs. 4.9; 4.8 vs. 6.5), P≤0.01 (1.9 vs. 4.9; 3.8 
vs. 5.8) and P≤0.001 (2.8 vs. 5.8; 3.3 vs. 6.5). 
 
Moreover, all possible comparisons (except for one9) are 
significant, both for the entire period and for the sub-
periods. The region variable is partly responsible for this 
result: on the one hand, the bigger the cabinet the more 
women are members; on the other hand, the size of cabinets 
varies by region, the federal cabinets being bigger (with a 
mean number of 31 members from 1984 to 2007), followed 
by central Canada (24.8; more specifically 24.7 in Ontario 
and 24.8 in Quebec), western Canada (19.7), and the Atlantic 
provinces (16); these gaps are statistically significant at the 
level of 95%. To add to this puzzle, cabinet size does not 
change the proportion of women ministers: smaller cabinets 
do not contain a significantly different proportion of women 
than do larger cabinets. 
That feminization rates do not differ according to the size 
of cabinets should be put in perspective because, during the 
period from 1984 to 2007, women were more numerous 
within cabinets that were shrinking in size and in which men 
were losing ground. More precisely, over this period, the 
average size of cabinets in Canada dropped from 21.5 mem-
bers (from 1984 to 1995) to 19.6 members (from 1996 to 
2007), a decline of 8.9%; the average number of men 
dropped by 19.4% (from 18.3 in 1984-95 to 14.7 in 1996-
2007); and the average number of women grew by 50.5% 
(from 3.2 to 4.8). This conveys not only the imperative that 
women be represented in cabinets (and recalls the observa-
tions by Kerby (2009) that women have a better chance of 
acceding to federal cabinets than do men), but the accentua-
tion of this imperative over time. Furthermore, one may 
hypothesize that female-male parity in cabinets is on the 
not-too-distant horizon: if the size of cabinets is kept con-
stant at 20 members, along with a 50% rise in the number of 
women and a 19% drop in the number of men per decade, 
cabinets should contain an equal number of women and men 
ministers sometime between 2015 and 2025. This scenario, 
however, does not take into account both the fact that simple 
linear projection is a poor tool for predicting future political 
events10 and the ideological label of parties that form the 
cabinets, an important variable when it comes to women’s 
access to power – Conservatives possibly pushing back the 
advent of the parity scenario and New Democrats and Liber-
als advancing it. 
 
Hypothesis 6: Right-wing cabinets have a lower proportion 
of women than do centrist and centre-left cabinets. 
As a rule, parties situated on the right side of the political 
spectrum manifest less enthusiasm for women’s political 
rights than do their counterparts on the left. This is why 
cabinets formed by right-wing parties should be less femi-
nized than cabinets formed by left-wing parties. This hy-
pothesis is confirmed: cabinets formed by Conservative 
leaders have significantly lower feminization rates than do 
cabinets formed by Liberal and New Democrat leaders: 
15.3% versus 24% (P≤0.001). This trend is maintained in the 
sub-periods (for 1984-95: 9.6% versus 18.2%, P≤0.01; for 
1996-2007: 19% versus 28.2%, P≤0.001). What is more, 
even withdrawing extreme cases from the analysis (the 12 
cabinets for which the feminization rate was below 10% and 
the 10 for which it was above 30%), the gap is maintained 
(19% versus 22%, P=0.06). In short, this is an institutional 
variable associated convincingly with women’s access to 
cabinets. 
 
To sum up, the proportion of women in Canadian cabinets 
formed following a federal or provincial election between 
1984 and 2007 is associated with a number of institutional 
variables: the feminization rate of the government legislative 
caucus and of all elected legislators, the number of cabinet 
positions to fill, the ideological orientation of the party form-
ing the cabinet, and, to a certain degree, the region. Moreo-
ver, minority governments and changes of government do 
not open cabinet doors to women. The next section presents 
the result of the regression analyses performed for a better 
understanding of the interrelationships among the inde-
pendent variables and their influences on the proportion of 
women ministers. 
 
Regression analyses  
Table 3 shows the results of four OLS regression analyses 
performed to uncover some of the institutional variables 
associated with women’s access to cabinets. As expected, the 
simultaneous integration within a single regression model of 
independent variables of the proportion of women within the 
government legislative caucus and the overall percentage of 
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women legislators revealed major inter-correlation prob-
lems,11 and so their impact on the proportion of women 
ministers was tested in separate models.  
A first comment concerns the importance of the percent-
age of women legislators, whether overall (model 1) or with-
in the government caucus only (model 2), in explaining the 
proportion of women ministers. In fact, each one of these 
variables covers just about all of the explanatory space in the 
models in which it was used (that is, about 76% in model 1 
and 80% in model 2), and its strong statistical significance 
(P=0.001) is never so far off the mark that the addition of 
other variables enriches the explanation significantly (see 
models 3 and 4). 
 
Table 3. Standardized beta coefficients (OLS regression analy-
sis) as for the dependent variable is the proportion of women 
in Canada’s cabinets from 1984 to 2007, and the dominant 
independent variable is either the overall proportion of women 
legislators or the proportion of women in the government 
legislative caucus. 
 
 Beta Std Error 
Model 1 (R2 adj.: 0.566)   
Overall % of women legislators*** .756 .125 
Model 2 (R2 adj.: 0.630)   
% of women in the government 
caucus*** 
.797 0.91 
Model 3 (R2 adj.: 0.644)   
Overall % of women legislators*** .507 .152 
Period** .231 1.705 
Region .167 1.392 
Government ideology** .243 1.566 
Size of the cabinet .002 1.129 
Model 4 (R2 adj.: 0.671)   
% of women in the government 
caucus*** 
.613 .129 
Period* .184 1.687 
Region .144 1.343 
Government ideology .121 1.645 
Size of the cabinet .073 1.116 
_______________ 
*** P≤0.001, ** P≤0.01, * P≤0.05 
 
From this arises a second comment about whether the over-
all proportion of women legislators or the proportion of 
women within the government legislative caucus exerts the 
more decisive influence on the feminization rate of cabinets. 
The results presented in Table 3 give credence to the latter 
variable. That said, the overall proportion of women legisla-
tors also has a hegemonic explanatory role in the models 
into which it is integrated (models 1 and 3). 
Models 3 and 4 take into account other independent var-
iables that are revealed by the bivariate analyses to exert 
some influence on the proportion of women ministers: the 
ideological label of the government party, the region, and the 
size of the cabinet.12 A temporal variable was also added, 
since the proportion of women ministers differs significantly 
depending on the sub-period (14.7% in 1984-95 and 24.3% 
in 1996-2007, P=0.001). These two models explain a sub-
stantial proportion of the variance (between 64.4% and 
67.1%).13 
The third comment arising from Table 3 regards the size 
of the cabinet at which the influence on the proportion of 
women ministers fades in comparison to other variables (see 
models 3 and 4). The fourth comment is that the ideology of 
the party called upon to form the government exerts an 
irregular influence on the proportion of women in the cabi-
net, being either significant (model 3) or not significant 
(model 4). In fact, it seemed as if the influence of the gov-
ernment’s ideology was notable for its presence among a 
diversified group of women legislators (that is, all women 
legislators), but that it completely disappeared when meas-
ured among a group of women legislators with an ideologi-
cally uniform stance (the percentage of women in the gov-
ernment caucus). Finally, aside from occupying a legislative 
seat (preferably in the government party), the proportion of 
women ministers responds to considerations of time: model 
3 and, secondarily, model 4 reveal the importance of the 
historical period – but not of the region – in explaining the 
proportion of women ministers. Whereas the former is not 
very surprising, the latter forces us to take a second look at 
the presumed impact of regionalism on women’s participa-
tion in cabinets. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The goal of this article was to examine certain institutional 
variables associated with women entering Canadian cabinets 
between 1984 and 2007. The analyses explored the contribu-
tion of six variables to the feminization of these select gov-
ernment teams: historical period, the overall proportion of 
women legislators and the share of seats that they occupy in 
the government legislative caucus, the size of the cabinet, the 
ideological label of the government party, and the region. 
The role of certain variables is not surprising (the period and 
the party forming the government), and the results confirm 
suspicions about other variables: for instance, the Atlantic 
provinces (notably Nova Scotia) show less enthusiasm to-
ward women’s participation in government. The results of 
this research also call for certain nuances with regard to the 
descriptive representation of women. One fundamental 
argument for adoption of a proportional electoral system is 
that the more spaces are available the more likely are women 
to occupy them. This reasoning is correct with regard to the 
number of women ministers, but it does not hold when the 
analysis looks at their proportion, as small and large cabi-
nets show statistically identical feminization rates. 
Remaining are the variables of overall proportion of fe-
male legislators and the proportion of female government 
legislators, both of which exert an almost monopolistic influ-
ence on the feminization rate of cabinets, with the latter 
seeming to take some precedence. This intermingling is not 
surprising, since there is a large overlap between these two 
groups, which highlights the problems of inter-collinearity 
between them. That said, what the statistics cannot confirm, 
custom may be able to do: in a British-tradition parliamen-
tary system, ultimately it is the presence of women within 
the government legislative caucus that will prove to be the 
most decisive variable, simply because ministers belong to 
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the government party and not to the opposition parties. 
Thus, whether the overall proportion of women legislators or 
that of women within the government parliamentary caucus 
exerts the most decisive influence over the proportion of 
women ministers is perhaps a false distinction, as British 
parliamentarianism circumscribes the pool of selection for 
cabinet ministers to legislators sitting on the government 
side. 
In this essay, I have looked at the institutional context to 
understand women’s access to cabinets, and not at factors of 
a personal order. Yet, these are important: age, schooling, 
profession, language spoken, ethnic origin, region, political 
experience, social capital, party factions and, more informal-
ly, closeness of relationship with the leader are just some of 
the factors that may lead to choosing one person over anoth-
er for the cabinet. In this perspective, it would be interesting 
to analyze the composition of each cabinet in order to bring 
to light the logics of representativeness underlying them. 
Beyond sex, to what criteria does appointment to the cabinet 
respond? In this mathematics of representativeness, in 
which the leader arranges her or his ministers in a sort of 
chess-type strategy, are women more profitable, politically, 
than men? This question, among others, is not answered by 
the studies. 
Other results arising from this research but not predicted 
by the hypotheses are very interesting. In fact, a number of 
data throw doubt on the Putnam’s law of increasing dispro-
portion, a principle that guides many analyses on women 
and politics. This ‘law’ states that the higher the political 
position, the harder it is for women to attain. Given the 
supremacy that the executive enjoys in the parliamentary 
system, the law of increasing disproportion should lead to 
the conclusion that there is a lower proportion of women 
minsters than of women legislators. However, observations 
drawn from the present research do not support this reason-
ing: while the average proportion of women legislators be-
tween 1984 and 2007 was 17.4% (and 17.8% for government 
legislative caucuses, the ante-chamber to executive power), 
the feminization rate of the 71 federal and provincial cabi-
nets over the period studied was 20.3% on average, a gap 
that is statistically significant (P=0.001). What is more, the 
gap is maintained for the sub-period 1996-2007 (P=0.003) 
and for some regions.14 Refuting the law of increasing dis-
proportion, power does not, in fact, evade women. 
 Yet, it is important not to reject the law of increas-
ing disproportion too quickly, for two reasons. First, it is 
possible that it subsists within cabinets – that is, that women 
find themselves at the bottom of the ministerial hierarchy 
(as junior ministers) and at the head of ‘pink’ ministries (for 
example, education, family, health). The second reason is 
that its heuristic value may depend on the overall proportion 
of women legislators: if a weak presence in the legislature 
allows for lack of representation in the cabinet, when they 
are more visible among the parliamentary ranks their ab-
sence from the cabinet is more difficult to explain. This 
reading is quite credible: preliminary analyses show that 
when women constitute less than 15% of all legislators, the 
proportion of women ministers is not significantly different 
(higher or lower) from the overall proportion of women 
legislators and women members of the government caucus, 
but when women are more visible in the legislature (at least 
15%), their proportion in the cabinet is statistically (P≤0.05) 
higher than the overall proportion of women legislators and 
women in the government caucus (Tremblay with the col-
laboration of Andrews 2010). It is as if once a certain numer-
ical weight is reached, a contagion effect is triggered from 
the legislative level to the executive one. Contrary to the 
concept of critical mass, the heuristic potential of which is 
now widely questioned (Beckwith 2007, Bratton 2005, 
Childs and Krook 2006, Studlar and McAllister 2002), the 
concept of the contagion effect has generated more convinc-
ing analysis; for instance, it has been shown that gender 
quotas in electoral politics are subject to contagion effects 
(see, among others, Krook 2004, Matland and Studlar 1996). 
Thus, if the adoption and implementation of a gender quota 
by one country helps to disseminate this measure to neigh-
bouring countries, one may suggest that when women are 
present in legislatures in numbers that can no longer be 
ignored, this may have a contagion effect on their appoint-
ment to cabinets. This proposed interpretation calls for 
further research. 
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Endnot	  
1  Discussing local governments in the UK, Bochel and Bochel 
(2008: 431) also identify such a relationship: ‘There was a 
stronger relationship between the percentage of councillors who 
are women and the proportion of the cabinet who are women.’ 
2  See section 22 of the Constitution Act, 1867. 
3  These works do not explore the impact of the voting system on 
the proportion of women cabinet ministers, a problem that fu-
ture research should explore (see Tremblay and Bauer 2011). In 
fact, I know of only one study that takes into account the poten-
tial impact of the voting system on the proportion of women 
cabinet ministers. Examining 72 countries in the mid-1990s, 
Whitford, Wilkins, and Ball (2007) note that cabinets contained 
more women in countries using open-list proportional represen-
tation voting systems than in countries using closed-list propor-
tional representation or single-member-plurality voting sys-
tems. They explain this intriguing result as follows: “The parties 
in coalition in these [open-list proportional representation] sys-
tems perceive and respond to what voters prefer ... and not just 
what voters have done in actually delivering women to the legis-
lature” (p. 570). It goes without saying that future research 
should explore this very interesting observation. 
4  To which is added a nationalist current not examined here 
because it is concentrated in Quebec, at least as of the late twen-
tieth century. 
5  Between 1984 and 2007, two cabinets contained only men. 
6  Table 1 also shows that the Atlantic provinces have significantly 
lower overall proportions of female legislators (all parties com-
bined) and of women within the government legislative caucus 
only than do Western and Central Canada, but not than the fed-
eral government. 
7  In Canada, a government is minority when the party that forms 
it does not have an absolute majority of seats in the House of 
Commons (for the federal level) or the legislature (in the prov-
inces). 
8  The 71 provincial and federal cabinets formed following a gen-
eral election between 1984 and 2007 were divided into three 
categories by size: from 9 to 17 members (23 of 71 cabinets, or 
32.4%), from 18 to 22 members (23/71), and from 23 to 39 
members (25/71, 35.2%). 
9  For the sub-period 1984-95, the gap between 1.9 and 2.5 is not 
statistically significant at the conventional thresholds. 
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10  The reason for this is less that linear projection is an uncertain 
statistical technique than in the fact that estimating the future 
based on the past supposes that the latter is an appropriate 
proxy for the former – a precept that needs to be demonstrated. 
11  The tolerance index is at 0.23 and variance inflation factor (VIF) 
at 4.42 for each of these independent variables. 
12  Despite the fact that the size of the cabinets varies significantly 
from one region to the other (see hypothesis 5), the tolerance 
index and variance inflation factor (VIF) do not reveal problems 
of inter-correlation when these two variables are integrated 
simultaneously in an OLS regression model. 
13  In models 3 and 4, the order in which the independent variables 
(that is, the period, the region, the government ideology, and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
size of the cabinet) were entered has no impact at all on the re-
sults (i.e., the beta and the standard error values). 
14  More specifically, for the entire period of 1984 to 2007: at the 
federal level, the gap between the proportion of women minis-
ters and the proportion of women members of the government 
caucus is significant (P≤0.05); in central Canada (Ontario and 
Quebec), between the proportion of women ministers and, on 
the one hand, women in the government caucus (P=0.001) and, 
on the other hand, overall proportion of women legislators 
(P=0.004). These gaps hold when analyses are run for Ontario 
and Quebec separately, although the statistical significance is 
weaker (P≤0.05 or P≤0.10, depending on the case). 	  
